Noam Rotstain | June 2025
Abstract
This paper explores the hypothetical collapse of the Islamic Republic of Iran through the comparative lens of the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991. It analyzes the internal dynamics that led to the Soviet collapse—economic stagnation, elite fragmentation, and ideological decay- and assesses how similar structural vulnerabilities may also destabilize the Iranian regime. Drawing from political science literature, post-authoritarian transition models, and regional case studies, this study outlines plausible outcomes for Iran’s domestic politics, proxy networks, and geopolitical realignment. While parallels between the two regimes are striking, Iran’s sectarian theocracy and regional entanglements introduce unique post-collapse complexities. The conclusion highlights the necessity of external engagement and internal reform to avoid a destructive vacuum that could leave the region at a tipping point.
Introduction
The collapse of the Soviet Union remains one of the most significant geopolitical events of the 20th century. It reshaped the global order, ended the Cold War, and spawned a new generation of political science literature on authoritarian decline and post-communist transitions. While the disintegration of the USSR was long perceived as surprising and sudden, deeper analysis reveals a buildup of structural failures: an inflexible ideological framework, a stagnating economy, and rising popular discontent. In contemporary Iran, observers are noting similar patterns with similar effects.
The Islamic Republic of Iran faces sustained civil unrest, economic deterioration, and growing rifts among its ruling elites ontop of the strikingly devastating Israel-US targeting of Iran’s nuclear program. Many now ask whether Iran could itself experience a dramatic collapse similar to that of the Soviet Union—and if so, what might follow. This paper explores that question by comparing key features of both regimes, examining Iran’s vulnerabilities, and forecasting possible outcomes of regime change—if it would truly happen.
Regime Similarities: Authoritarianism, Ideology, and Expansionism
Both the Soviet Union and the Islamic Republic of Iran were built on revolutionary ideologies that claimed moral and historical legitimacy. Marxism-Leninism promised a classless utopia led by a vanguard party; Khomeinism established a theocratic state under the doctrine of Vilayat-e Faqih, in which political leadership was fused with Shi’a religious authority (Takeyh, 2009). These ideologies sought to engineer not only political systems but entire societies, penetrating schools, media, law, and culture.
Internationally, both regimes viewed themselves as ideological exporters with their beliefs having to be the default standard for the greater world, not only for Moscow or Teheran’s own good—but for the world at large. The USSR supported leftist revolutions in Cuba, Vietnam, and Angola (Gaddis, 2005), while Iran has funded and coordinated Shi’a proxy groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and numerous Iraqi militias (Byman, 2005; Ranstorp, 1997). Both strategies strained domestic resources and provoked regional and global isolation, contributing to long-term economic and diplomatic instability and frustrated civilians.
Structural Vulnerabilities and Collapse Conditions
Economic Decay and Resource Mismanagement
The Soviet economy, by the 1980s, had become stagnant and overburdened. Military expenditure consumed over 15% of GDP, while consumer goods remained scarce. Agricultural inefficiencies and failed industrial reforms under Gorbachev only deepened the crisis (Kotkin, 2001). Temporary windfalls from oil prices delayed the inevitable, but could not conceal systemic rot (Medvedev, 1990).
Iran faces similar circumstances. Sanctions, mismanagement, and corruption—particularly by the IRGC—have crippled growth. Iran’s GDP shrank by nearly 7% in 2020 alone, and inflation now exceeds 40%. Over 60% of the economy is controlled by state-affiliated conglomerates, undermining private sector development (Alfoneh, 2013; Salehi-Isfahani, 2022). Iran’s reliance on oil has left it vulnerable to price shocks, while rampant brain drain and capital flight signal growing elite pessimism (Keddie, 2006).
Elite Fragmentation
A defining feature of the Soviet collapse was the rift within the Communist Party. Reformists clashed with hardliners, and Gorbachev’s failure to maintain unity opened the door to decentralization and dissolution (Suny, 1993). The failed August 1991 coup by party conservatives symbolized the Party’s fracture and the unraveling of central authority (Brown, 1996).
In Iran, internal division is accelerating. Moderates like Rouhani and technocrats such as Zarif are increasingly sidelined by hardliners aligned with the Supreme Leader and the IRGC. As Khamenei’s health declines, a contested succession could pit clerical factions against military elites (Geddes, Wright, & Frantz, 2018; Brumberg, 2001). The opaque nature of Iran’s political system, devoid of institutionalized succession, magnifies the risk of a power vacuum which underlines the need for alternatives.
Ideological Exhaustion
Ideology loses power when it no longer reflects lived reality. Soviet citizens grew disillusioned with Communist promises as their material conditions worsened and the state’s hypocrisy became glaringly apparent. Gorbachev’s glasnost policy exposed the extent of the state’s failures, accelerating public rejection of the Party (Kotkin, 2001).
Iran is experiencing a similar crisis of legitimacy. The Mahsa Amini protests of 2022 catalyzed a wave of dissent across ethnic, class, and gender lines. Slogans like “Woman, Life, Freedom” signal a broader demand for secularism and individual rights (Hoodfar, 2022; Sreberny & Torfeh, 2013). Voter turnout in 2021 hit a record low, and even traditionally conservative constituencies have expressed frustration with clerical rule. The regime’s religious narrative no longer inspires—it alienates with many studies since 2022 testifying to a sharp decrease in Islamic observance marked by empty mosques, and a loudening demand for a separation of religion and state—virtually impossible for this regime.
What Can Be Foreseen Post-Collapse?
Drawing from post-authoritarian transition theory and regional case studies, several scenarios emerge following a possible collapse of the Islamic Republic.
First, the IRGC could attempt to establish control, transitioning Iran into a military dictatorship. Its economic networks, intelligence apparatus, and ideological training programs make it the most powerful actor in a collapsed state scenario (Tabatabai, 2020; Alfoneh, 2013). This would mirror Russia’s trajectory under Putin—stability without liberalization.
Second, civil society and the diaspora may attempt a democratic transition. Iran has historical experience with constitutionalism (1906) and mass mobilization (1979). If reformist clerics, women’s groups, and youth activists can build coalitions, a democratic model akin to Eastern Europe post-1989 is possible (Martin, 2000; McFaul, 2001).
Third, fragmentation is a real risk. Iran’s ethnic minorities—Kurds, Balochs, Arabs, and Azeris—have longstanding grievances. Without a unifying national project, centrifugal forces may tear the country apart, as happened in the Balkans and Caucasus post-USSR (Khalaji, 2017).
Geopolitically, Iran’s proxies will weaken. Groups like Hezbollah and the Houthis, heavily dependent on Iranian funding, may disintegrate or reorient toward other patrons. Regional states will race to fill the void: Turkey in northern Iraq, Saudi Arabia in Yemen, and Israel in southern Syria. Iran itself may pivot toward economic reconstruction and diplomacy if nationalist forces dominate post-collapse politics (Hunter, 2014).
Finally, Iran’s nuclear infrastructure poses a serious risk. Without centralized control, the possibility of proliferation or sabotage increases. International actors would likely act swiftly to secure or neutralize facilities, as seen in the post-Soviet Nunn-Lugar programs (Allison, 1996).
Research Policy Recommendation: Filling the Post-Collapse Vacuum in Iran
To avoid a dangerous power vacuum following the potential collapse of the Islamic Republic and letting nuclear chemicals and infrastructure to fall into the wrong hands, international actors—particularly liberal democracies, regional partners, and multilateral institutions—must prepare a coordinated and well-resourced policy framework. This policy should center on three pillars: inclusive transition support, institutional capacity-building, and regional stabilization.
I. Support Inclusive Political Transitions: The U.S., EU, and UN must signal immediate support for a transitional authority that reflects Iran’s ethnic and political diversity. Learning from successful transitions in Eastern Europe, this body should be tasked with drafting a secular, pluralistic constitution by the people of Iran and organizing internationally monitored elections within 18–24 months. Engagement with moderate clerics, women’s groups, and civil society networks will be essential to build broad legitimacy (McFaul, 2001; Martin, 2000).
II. Prevent Militarized Power Consolidation: To prevent the IRGC or other paramilitary groups from hijacking the transition, an international stabilization force—potentially coordinated through a regional contact group or under UN mandate—should secure major nuclear and military sites. Lessons from post-Ba’athist Iraq and post-Soviet Russia warn against allowing entrenched security elites to dominate post-collapse governance (Dodge, 2006; Geddes et al., 2018).
III. Launch an Economic Recovery Compact: A multilateral aid package, modeled on the Marshall Plan or the EU Neighborhood Policy, should be developed in advance. This would include emergency funding to stabilize currency and energy prices, debt relief incentives, and investment in small and medium enterprises. Institutions like the IMF and World Bank should prepare readiness assessments for rapid deployment (Aslund, 2007).
IV. Empower Regional Partnerships: Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Gulf states should be incentivized to cooperate in securing Iran’s borders and re-integrating Iran into regional trade and diplomacy. Confidence-building measures, such as regional energy agreements and counter-terrorism coordination, could shift dynamics from confrontation to inclusion (Hunter, 2014).
V. Strengthen Iranian Civil Society and Media: Diaspora organizations, independent media, and cultural institutions must be protected and supported. Training, funding, and secure communication tools should be provided to local actors promoting democratic norms. Strategic investments in Farsi-language information infrastructure—similar to Radio Free Europe—could play a critical role in shaping the post-collapse narrative (Sreberny & Torfeh, 2013).
By laying this groundwork now, the international community can mitigate the risk of chaos and support the emergence of a post-Islamic Republic Iran that is more stable, democratic, and engaged with the world to permit a more stable and peaceful Middle East.
Conclusion
The Soviet Union’s collapse offers a compelling roadmap for understanding the vulnerabilities and possible outcomes in Iran. Both regimes suffered from internal contradictions: economies mismanaged for ideological purposes, elite structures unable to adapt, and populations no longer inspired by revolutionary slogans. Yet Iran’s religious governance, regional entanglements, and unique political culture ensure that its post-collapse path will not be identical.
What comes after the Islamic Republic depends on the balance of power among security forces, reformist actors, and civil society. It also hinges on how international stakeholders engage: will they support democratic reform or tolerate authoritarian continuity? The stakes are high. A successful transition could remake Iran into a pluralistic regional stabilizer. A failed one risks chaos, fragmentation, and global security threats like never before. A stable Iran makes a stable Middle East, and from there a stable international environment.
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